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LEIBNIZ ON SENSATION  
AND THE LIMITS OF REASON
Walter Ott
The taste of burnt coffee, the smell of lemon-scented cleaning fluid, 
the sound of F# played poorly on a bassoon: these sensations are not 
just unpleasant but deeply puzzling. Why should this particular set of 
pressure waves bring about this auditory sensation and no other? Why 
should this arrangement of atoms cause this and only this lemony scent?
 These questions are liable to evoke in readers’ minds the “explana-
tory gap.”1 That gap stretches between neural states on one hand and 
technicolor experience on the other: how can states of the hunk of meat 
between our ears explain mental states, with their own peculiar phe-
nomenal character? The moderns, however, are worried about a different 
gap altogether.
In a letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte, Leibniz summarizes the explana-
tory gap he is worried about:
[The external senses] allow us to know their particular objects, which 
are colors, sounds, odors, flavors, and the tactile qualities. But they 
do not allow us to know what these sensible qualities are, nor what 
they consist in, for example, whether red is the rotation of certain 
small globes which, it is claimed, make up light, whether heat is a 
vortex of very fine dust, whether sound is produced in air as circles 
are in water when a stone is tossed in, as some philosophers claim. 
We do not see these things, and we cannot even understand why this 
rotation, these vortices, and these circles, if they are real, should 
bring about exactly the perceptions we have of red, heat, and noise. 
(AG 186/G VI 499)2
 However far science advances in understanding the causal relation-
ships involved, it will always fall short of a full explanation of sensation. 
Plug in whatever analysis of sound or color you like, Leibniz suggests, 
and you still will not understand why we experience the sensible quali-
ties we do. Such qualities are, in short, “occult.”3
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 From a contemporary perspective, it can be hard to see just what 
Leibniz is worried about. The real action, one might think, lies at the 
intersection of the brain state and the phenomenal state. That a neural 
state should give rise to a mental state at all, let alone one of this precise 
character and no other, is the only real mystery. The connection between 
the mental state and its cause outside the body is neither particularly 
interesting nor particularly problematic.
 To see the force of Leibniz’s worry, consider some experiences where 
his explanatory gap does not arise, namely, experiences of primary quali-
ties. Why does a penny, seen straight on, look circular? Because it is. 
The facts of the world outside the mind fully account for the contents of 
one’s perception. Now, of course, when held at an angle, the penny looks 
elliptical. But even here there is no gap; the fact that it looks elliptical 
can be explained by a combination of optics and geometry. Once one is 
in possession of the relevant facts, even in their broadest outlines, any 
air of mystery evaporates. The match between sensory experiences of 
size, shape, and motion and the size, shape, and motion of real objects 
is a tight one.
 By contrast, the mystery surrounding our initial questions persists 
even in light of causal illumination. Why should we sense red and not 
blue when we are in the presence of a tomato, in standard conditions? 
The inverted spectrum thought experiment is one familiar reflection of 
the slack between some of the features given in experience and their 
causes: if one of us were sensing blue instead of red, there might be no 
way to tell.4 The precise distribution of color experiences seems not to 
matter much to behavior, provided the structural relations among the 
experiences are preserved. No one, as far as I know, has been much 
tempted by a parallel thought experiment using the inversion of shape 
or size. If one of us senses cubes where the other senses spheres, that 
difference will soon enough make itself felt in experience. In what fol-
lows, I’ll call experiences of “sensible qualities” such as tastes, smells, 
and colors “sensations.”5 The problem, then, is that there is a “looseness 
of fit” between the way the world outside the mind is and the sensa-
tions we find ourselves undergoing. The principle of sufficient reason 
(henceforth PSR) demands that there be an explanation for why just 
this sensible quality (say, red) and no other is experienced when it is.6 
Yet, particularly where colors are concerned, Leibniz recognizes that 
making room for even an in-principle explanation is no mean feat.
 Leibniz is among the most optimistic of the moderns and the most 
creative. So it is no surprise that he deploys an ingenious method to 
take up the slack between sensations and their causes. Leibniz argues 
that sensations are representations because “there is a resemblance of a 
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sort” between them and their objects (NE 131). If so, it is no coincidence 
that yellow sensations happen in the presence of the sun and not of dirt.7 
For the yellow sensation represents (some property of) the sun and not 
(some property of) the dirt. Sensations do not, after all, slip through the 
net of explanation.
 After considering a variety of ways of understanding Leibniz’s thesis, 
I conclude that none of them succeeds in closing the gap. In the end, 
the only explanation for the precise pairing of a sensation and its object 
comes from God’s choice of possible world. Leibniz never explicitly offers 
this explanation, for he seems to have been convinced that representation 
is sufficient to close the gap. Nevertheless, his view has the resources 
to solve the problem.
 Before beginning, let me enter two caveats. First, I shall mainly be 
concerned with Leibniz’s New Essays. It can be unclear at times just how 
seriously Leibniz means us to take his claims; in particular, he seems 
to accept more of Locke’s ontology than he does in other late works, 
like the Monadology. It would not be unusual for Leibniz to adopt the 
framework of his interlocutor in order to allow his arguments to make 
contact with their targets. In any case, I propose to table the question 
whether Leibniz even believes there are bodies until the end.
 Second, I will throughout try to pare away what I regard as controversial 
contemporary assumptions. In particular, as I’ve already argued, Leibniz’s 
core concerns in the New Essays do not include phenomenal character or 
“what-it’s-like.” Given his focus on sensible qualities, it would be more 
accurate to say that Leibniz is worried about “what-it’s-of”: just what are 
these sensible qualities we meet with in sensory experience? Most of my 
interlocutors either disagree or do not make the distinction.8 This makes 
entering into debate with them an opportunity for confusion and talking 
at cross-purposes. In general, then, when I speak of sensations and of 
sensible qualities, I am bracketing all questions of phenomenal character. 
Only when addressing competing views will I take up such issues.
1. leIbnIz’s exPlanatory GaP
The moderns in general, and Locke in particular, are impressed by 
the apparent arbitrariness of sensations. In the New Essays, Leibniz 
bristles at the implication: there are states of affairs that are, in prin-
ciple, inexplicable. To suggest that the sensation of F# just happens to 
be correlated with such-and-such pressure waves is to violate the PSR. 
As Leibniz has Theophilus put it,
It must not be thought that ideas such as those of color and pain are 
arbitrary and that between them and their causes there is no relation 
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or natural connection: it is not God’s way to act in such an unruly and 
unreasoned fashion. (NE 131)
 From Leibniz’s point of view, the Cartesians—including Locke—think 
God provides our soul with sensations “without concern for any essential 
relation between perceptions and their objects” (NE 56; see NE 131). 
As Leibniz reads him, Locke is denying that there is any explanation, 
other than a brute causal one, for the connection between objects and our 
sensations. While understandable, that reading is not quite fair, since 
Locke’s epistemic modesty prohibits him from making such a claim. The 
nearest Locke comes is this:
Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect 
body, and motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able 
to produce nothing but motion; so that when we allow it to produce 
pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit 
our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good 
pleasure of our Maker. (Essay IV.iii.6:541)
 The epistemic language—“as far as we can conceive”—suggests that 
Locke is not making a metaphysical claim. And presumably Locke isn’t 
recommending that we “quit our reason.” The point is that our concep-
tual resources are too meager to allow us to construct an explanation, 
not that there cannot in principle be one. Nevertheless, there are good 
grounds to think that the bolder claim is, in fact, true, if one accepts the 
primary/secondary quality distinction. What would count as an expla-
nation of the connection between a given set of pressure waves and the 
sensation of F#?
 To see Leibniz’s answer, we first need a clearer understanding of 
his notion of sensation. On his view, sensations arise out of petites 
perceptions. These perceptions are petites in that they are individually 
unnoticeable. Only in the aggregate do they make themselves known, 
by virtue of their variation with previous sets of perceptions or by their 
collective force or “size.” When perceptions are distinct, they are apt to 
be noticed by a mind and apperceived.9 And when they are, they “form” 
(forment) the “je ne sais quoi, those flavors, those images of sensible quali-
ties, vivid in the aggregate but confused as to the parts” (NE 54–55).10
Sometimes Leibniz seems to take sensations just to be complexes of pe-
tites perceptions (call this the “aggregate” view).11 In other words, Leibniz 
does, after all, sait quoi: if only we had the ability to tease apart all the 
individual petites perceptions, we would become aware of a multitude 
of representational states. The running together of petites perceptions 
in consciousness leads us to mistake what is, in fact, a heterogeneous 
multitude for a simple, unanalyzable unity.s__
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At other times, however, Leibniz suggests that sensations are the result 
of these complexes (call this the “emergent” view). On the emergent view, 
the confusion of petites perceptions results in a sensation that really is 
simple and unanalyzable.12 Even within a single work, there is evidence 
for each. In the New Essays, for example, Leibniz tells us that “[T]here 
are motions in the fire that are not distinctly sensible individually, but 
whose confusion or conjunction becomes sensible and is represented to 
us by the idea of light” (NE 132).13 The beginning of this sentence looks 
like evidence for the aggregate view: it is the confusion that becomes 
sensible. But note that it is a confusion of motions in the fire, not of 
petites perceptions. And this confusion of motions becomes sensible by 
being represented to us by the idea of light. That suggests emergence, 
not aggregation.
 Elsewhere in the New Essays, Leibniz talks as if he has the aggregate 
view in mind. When a wheel spins fast enough, its rotation “makes the 
teeth disappear and an imaginary continuous transparent [ring] appear 
in their place.” For this reason, Leibniz prefers to call colors, tastes, and 
so on phantoms (“fantômes”) “rather than qualities or even ideas” (NE 
403–4).14 These fantômes disappear if we look at the minute perceptions 
individually, just as the illusory solid wheel vanishes from experience 
when we slow it down.
 It is very hard to tell whether Leibniz endorses the emergent or ag-
gregate view; each has considerable support.15 Happily, that question 
is orthogonal to our concerns here. For whether a Leibnizian sensa-
tion is simple or complex, it can still be said to represent its object by 
resembling it. Our questions, then, are two: what does Leibniz mean 
by “resemblance”? And is resemblance in the relevant sense enough to 
close his explanatory gap?
2. lIteral resemblanCe
One possibility is that Leibniz’s sensations resemble what they repre-
sent in the ordinary sense of the term. Two cubes resemble each other 
in respect of shape just in case each instantiates the (qualitatively) 
same shape.
 Such a view would, I think, close Leibniz’s explanatory gap. A sensa-
tion of F# is the only sensation that could arise out of (or simply be) 
this aggregate, given the petites perceptions that make it up. And those 
tiny perceptions have to be as they are, for they instantiate just the 
same properties that their objects in the world do. If representation 
is literal resemblance, then any variation in the property represented 
means that the representing state, in fact, fails to represent its target. __s
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Typically, philosophers count that point against resemblance theories. 
In our context, it would be a virtue.
 Does Leibniz, as Alison Simmons claims, mean “the resemblance talk 
as literally as possible” (2001, 68)?16 Unfortunately, I do not think the 
textual evidence supports this claim. In the New Essays, Leibniz writes,
It must not be thought that ideas such as those of color and pain 
are arbitrary and without relation or natural connection with their 
causes; it is not God’s way to act with so little order and reason. I 
would say, rather, that there is a resemblance of a sort, not a perfect 
one which holds all the way through, but a resemblance in which one 
thing expresses another through an orderly relationship. (NE 131)17
 Here, Leibniz seems clearly to be rejecting resemblance and substi-
tuting his own distinctive notion of expression.18
 Further evidence points us in the same direction. In the preface to the 
New Essays, Leibniz claims that petites perceptions “bring it about that 
those perceptions of colours, warmth and other sensible qualities are 
related to the motions in bodies which correspond to them” (NE 56). It is 
by virtue of the fact that the petites perceptions, imperceptible individu-
ally but covarying with motions in bodies, prompt sensations that those 
sensations stand in “precise and natural” relations with those motions.
 Our result might have seemed inevitable had we not been so narrowly 
focused on vision. It is one thing to suppose that the sensation of the 
blurred wheel might be a confused apprehension of literally resembling 
pictures of the wheel. But how could the sound of F# resemble the me-
chanical cause, say, a vibrating string? True, if the aggregate reading is 
correct, the resemblance is happening at a level not open to introspection. 
It is the petites perceptions that resemble the object in the world. Still, 
it is obscure just how an unnoticed tiny perception of a sound is better 
placed to resemble a vibrating string than a big, noticed aggregate of 
tiny perceptions (or, if you prefer, the appearance of that aggregate).
3. resemblanCe as exPressIon
Even if Leibniz’s resemblance is not of the literal sort, it might still 
help him close the explanatory gap. What other varieties are available? 
Perhaps the most promising one is isomorphism, as Pauline Phemister 
has suggested. As she reads Leibniz’s exchange with Lady Masham, 
among other texts, it is the “thoroughgoing isomorphic mapping of the 
[the soul’s] perceptions to the motions of its body” that secures the “intel-
ligibility and naturalness” of the sensation/object link (2011, 97 and 99).
 One might have different standards of intelligibility or naturalness, 
of course. Our question is this: can the fact that the states of the soul 
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express states of the body close Leibniz’s explanatory gap? Here we must 
proceed with caution, since we cannot take for granted that Leibniz has 
in mind what we would call “isomorphism.”
 In what sense, precisely, does Leibniz think sensations “express” their 
causes? In general, expression names a relation that holds when one 
thing, state, or property allows one to infer something about another 
thing, state, or property. This broad notion is, I suggest, made precise in 
three very different ways in Leibniz’s work. Our first kind of expression, 
call it “Expression1,” is indication by way of causation: as Leibniz puts 
it, “[E]very effect expresses its cause.” In such contexts, he claims that 
the object of every perception is God (Discourse § 28, AG 509).19 That any 
substance exists at all allows one to infer that God exists since God is 
its cause. Expression1 is of no use to us in taking up the slack between 
sensations and their causes: to say that a sensation has a cause is not 
to give an explanation, in the sense required by the PSR.
 A second kind of expression is what we might call predicative. The 
predicates that are true of one substance are mirrored by the predicates 
that are true of another. One state of Adam that might “expresss2” a state 
of Cain is Adam’s being the father of someone with all of Cain’s proper-
ties; similarly, Cain will have the property of being the son of someone 
with all of Adam’s properties. Expression2 holds among substances 
when their properties answer to each other in the way exemplified by 
our Adam and Cain example.20
 Although commentators sometimes claim—or, more often, assume—
that Expression2 is the core sense of “expression” in Leibniz, there is 
still a further sense, one that does not appeal to relational properties 
like “standing in R to some substance that is F.” To see this, consider 
Leibniz’s own explications of “expression”:
That is said to express a thing in which there are relations that cor-
respond to the relations of the thing expressed. (“What Is an Idea?” 
[1678], L 207/G VIII 263).
It is sufficient for the expression of one thing in another that there 
should be a certain constant relational law, by which particulars in 
the one can be referred to corresponding particulars in the other. 
(“Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Sufficient Reason” 
[1712], PW176–7/C 15)
  Expression3 is not a question of a mirroring of predicates.
21 Instead, 
it can relate objects and states such as sensations. This is at least one 
sense in which all the perceptions of all substances “mutually corre-
spond” with each other (see Discourse § 14, AG 47).
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 As a first pass, we might say that Expression3 holds among the 
members of two sets A and B when there is at least one relation among 
the members of A that is preserved among the members of B. As Chris 
Swoyer puts it, there must be a “structure-preserving mapping” from 
one to the other (1995, 82). Nothing in Leibniz, however, suggests that 
every relation in A must be preserved in B. As long as there is one such 
relation, one set will express the other. And at the risk of stating the 
obvious, Expression3 is miles away from resemblance in the literal 
sense. Consider the example Leibniz uses to illustrate the “resemblance 
of a sort” he has in mind in the New Essays: “an ellipse, and even a 
parabola or hyperbola, resemble in some fashion the circle of which 
they are a projection on a plane, since there is a certain precise and 
natural relation between what is projected and that projection which 
is made from it” (NE 131). Even a square can express3 a circle since it 
will preserve the “between” relation among the points.22 If Expression3 
is at issue, it is not very difficult to see how sensations might express 
nonsensory states of affairs. After all, a little effort shows how you can 
pair the cardinal directions with the seasons and preserve the relation 
“is the opposite of.”23
 On my reading, then, Leibniz does indeed claim that sensations both 
resemble and represent mechanical features of bodies. What he means 
by these claims, however, is just that sensations exhibit some relations 
that mirror some relations among the objects that cause them. In this 
attenuated sense, sensations “resemble” their causes. That claim is 
not enough to take up the slack between sensation and object. For any 
sensation at all would do just as well, as long as it was capable of stand-
ing in the relevant relation. Now, it might be that Leibniz does intend 
there to be a mapping from sensations to bodily states such that every 
relation in one set is mirrored in the other. Even if that is so, the central 
point remains unaffected. For as long as there is even one competing 
distribution that preserves all of these relations, the gap remains open.
 Someone might object that, if I am right, there is no substantive point 
at issue between Locke and Leibniz when it comes to sensation. As it 
happens, I think this is, in fact, the case. Leibniz consistently exaggerates 
both the arbitrariness of Locke’s view and the explanatory powers of 
his own. Consider how Martha Bolton sees the dispute: Leibniz claims, 
and Locke denies, that a sensation “carries information” by means of a 
“structural analogy” (2011, 211). For my part, I cannot see why Locke 
would deny that claim: after all, he spends much of Essay II.xxx–xxxii 
arguing that God has provided us with ideas of both primary and second-
ary qualities to aid us in finding our way through the world. Such ideas 
could hardly perform this function if they did not carry “information” in 
the very minimal sense Leibniz believes they do.
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 Still, it’s important not to exaggerate the shortcomings of Leibniz’s 
position in the New Essays. Against Locke as Leibniz reads him, Leibniz’s 
view is a significant step toward accommodating the PSR. Leibniz can 
truly say that sensible qualities, even if they are mere fantômes, cannot 
be randomly sprinkled over our experiences. They at least must stand 
in the systematic relationships we’ve discussed. What is more, Leibniz 
might well argue that the arbitrariness of some sensible qualities is 
exaggerated. The taste of acidity, for example, might play a significant 
role in the preservation of the mind-body union. I want to leave open the 
degree to which the preservation of the life of the subject might explain 
at least some of the pairings of sensible and primary qualities.
 Nevertheless, if there are even two incompatible distributions of sen-
sations that do not sin against these considerations, Leibniz will have 
failed to bring in the slack. In other words, expression, in any of its senses, 
cannot do all the work required by the PSR. That is not the end of the 
matter since there might be some other notion that can. In particular, we 
should consider whether Leibniz’s notion of analysis can help.
 Leibniz consistently maintains that we can give an analysis of sensa-
tions. In a short piece on analysis and synthesis, Leibniz claims that, 
although a sensation cannot be given a nominal definition, “its nature 
is analyzable, since it has a cause” (De Synthesi L 230/A VI 4 540). Hav-
ing a cause, as we have seen, falls far short of being intelligible, in the 
sense the PSR requires. In another text, however, Leibniz suggests a 
more promising kind of analysis:
The secret of analysis in physics consists in this one device: the reduc-
tion [revocatio] of the confused qualities of the senses (namely: heat and 
cold in the case of touch, flavors in the case of taste, odors in the case 
of smell, sounds in the case of hearing, and colors in the case of sight) 
to the distinct qualities that accompany them, namely number, size, 
shape, motion, and cohesion, of which the last two are proper to physics.
 Leibniz’s talk of sensations that “accompany” (comitantur) experiences 
of primary qualities betrays a total absence of reductive aspirations. G. 
H. R. Parkinson’s deflationary reading of revocatio as merely tracing an 
effect to its cause is confirmed by the sequel:
For with the aid of certain qualities that are sufficient to determine the 
nature of bodies, we can discover their causes, and from these causes 
we can demonstrate their other effects, i.e., the rest of their qualities, 
and so in a roundabout way discover what is real and distinct in con-
fused qualities. For that remainder that cannot be explained (as, for 
example, the way in which the appearance we call yellowness arises 
out of that in which we have shown yellowness to consist objectively) 
must be known to depend, not on the thing itself, but on the disposition 
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of our organs and on the most minute structure of things. (Revocatio 
[1677], C 190, trans. Parkinson 1982, 20)
 Here we have an intricate structure of causal dependence that still 
falls short of explanation. Although one can use sensations in this “round-
about” way to learn something of the primary qualities of bodies, Leibniz 
says there will always be a “remainder that cannot be explained.”
 Something in sensations resists analysis, even if we take a different 
view of the relation between sensations and experiences of primary 
qualities. The Revocatio treats them as mere accompaniments, but, in 
the letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte, Leibniz tells us that size and shape 
are in color. Since sensible qualities “are in fact occult qualities . . . there 
must be others more manifest that can render them explicable” (AG 
186/G VI 492). Size and shape, it seems, are these “more manifest” quali-
ties. In this respect, “sensible qualities are capable of being explained 
and reasoned about” (AG 187/G VI 500). A visual shape is perceived by 
perceiving color; still, which color it is seems to make too little difference. 
It is just as easy to generate the inverted spectrum scenario, indicating 
that a gap remains. Even when features we can fully understand are 
contained within sensible qualities, those qualities remain occult.
 Let us consider one final sense in which we can “analyze” colors. 
Leibniz tells us, in both the New Essays and the “Meditations on Truth, 
Cognition, and Ideas,” that the idea of green in some sense can be re-
solved into the ideas of blue and yellow. But Leibniz never suggests that 
such an analysis can be given for all sensations. Second, this analysis 
only shows us the causes of the sensation. So when Leibniz claims in 
the New Essays that some sensations “do admit of real definitions,” he 
means only that we can figure out “what causes them” (NE 297).
In the end, neither representation nor any of the other notions Leibniz 
appeals to can close his explanatory gap. We know, given the PSR, that 
all explanatory gaps are due to our benighted epistemic state. But there 
is no good reason to think that, even in principle, we can use these rep-
resentational strategies on their own to explain why just this sensation 
and no other occurs in the circumstances that it does. Now, Leibniz’s 
view, as developed so far, does rule out God’s randomly sprinkling minds 
with sensations, in no particular order; it also rules out God’s flipping 
our spectra (unless he has some further reason to do so). While these 
points take us some distance in appeasing the PSR, they do not take us 
all the way. Systematically inverted color spectra would do just as well 
at preserving whatever structural relations one likes. It is perhaps tell-
ing that Leibniz declines to take up Locke’s inverted-spectrum thought 
experiment in the New Essays. For, if I am right, the Leibniz of the New 
Essays has no good answer to the problem it poses for the PSR.
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 In the next section, I argue that Leibniz’s system has the resources 
to construct such an answer, even if he does not explicitly offer it. Before 
turning to that response, however, let me entertain an objection. One 
might think that it is simply obvious that expression, in any sense, will 
not be able to take up all the slack in Leibniz’s system. Sensations will 
slip through the net. One might then argue that Leibniz must have seen 
this. Charity might then require us to read Leibniz very differently than 
I have, as, say, an intentionalist avant le mot.
 I would argue that we are justified in assuming neither that the prob-
lem with expression is obvious nor that Leibniz must have seen it if it 
were. M. H. A. Newman proved that any two sets of equal cardinality can 
be isomorphic: “Any collection of things can be organised so as to have 
[a given structure], provided there are the right number of them” (1928, 
144). The point was presumably not obvious to the target of Newman’s 
argument, Bertrand Russell, nor does it appear to have been obvious 
to Carnap. We should not be surprised if Leibniz fails to have foreseen 
Newman’s point. Happily, Leibniz’s resources include more than the 
doctrine of expression.
4. the best PossIble World
Once we give up on the claim that sensations can be tied to their ob-
jects by means of their own intrinsic and nonrelational qualities, as the 
literal resemblance view has it, we are forced back on the expression 
relations in which those sensations stand. And even those relations 
are insufficient. The only real way to close Leibniz’s explanatory gap 
is to appeal to the doctrine of the best possible world. As we shall see, 
Leibniz will still need to exploit the resources we discussed above. The 
doctrine of expression has an important role to play. My claim is that it 
cannot close the gap on its own, but only in tandem with the doctrine 
of the best possible world.
 Note that a number of criteria constrains God’s choice of world. God 
wants to create the greatest variety with the simplest means.24 And, of 
course, he wants to create a world in which each substance expresses 
all the others. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that these constraints 
determine just one possible world as the best among all others. Then 
the problem of sensation, I shall argue, disappears.
 Why is this sensation, and no other, instantiated in this substance at 
this time? Leibniz can give a three-stage answer. Expression3 requires 
that at least one or more relations among the perceptions of one monad 
be mirrored by the relations among the perceptions of the other monads. 
Expression2 requires that the predicates of any substance, including predi-
cations of perceptions of sensible qualities, be mirrored by the predicates of 
__s
__n
lc
HPQ 33_2 text.indd   145 2/19/16   9:54 AM
146 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
all other substances. Each perception follows from a substance’s complete 
concept, from which all its predicates, future and past, are deducible.
 That leaves us with the question: why is this substance, with this 
sensation at this time, instantiated? The only answer can be that this 
substance is a necessary ingredient in the best possible world, in which 
each substance expresses every other. There is no more reason to be wor-
ried about sensations than about perceptions generally. What satisfies 
the PSR, what really explains why this sensation and no other occurs, 
is the uniqueness of the best possible world.
All of this is consistent with the fact that, from our benighted point of 
view, we cannot attain a complete grasp of just why the actual distribu-
tion of sensible qualities is as it is and not otherwise. But the doctrine 
of the best possible world assures us that there is such a reason. That 
claim is something we know a priori.25 It would indeed be impossible to 
examine the empirical evidence bit by bit and conclude, on the basis of 
experience, that our world is the best one possible.
 But, of course, such a situation is hardly unusual. The same is true 
of the presence of suffering in the world. We know that such suffering 
is in the end for the best, not because we have privileged insight into 
the arrangement of the world but because we know it was created by 
a God who acts only for the best and produces the one and only world 
that maximizes the features he values.
 Let me consider one last complication. There is a lively debate about 
whether Leibniz even believes in corporeal substance. He might be 
acquiescing in such talk only for the purposes of argument (as might 
be the case in the New Essays), or he might intend such language to be 
translated ultimately into the ontology of simple substances.26 Some 
authors, such as Daniel Garber, have argued that Leibniz’s middle period 
is simply agnostic with respect to corporeal substance; still others, that 
Leibniz’s ontology is ultimately incoherent.27
 Nevertheless, it is worth asking what Leibniz’s view amounts to, if we 
try to make it conform to what Leibniz, in the Discourse, calls “rigorous 
metaphysical truth” (AG 59). There, as elsewhere, Leibniz challenges the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities.28 If his explanatory 
gap presupposes that distinction, might not his idealist metaphysics, 
which abandons it, close the gap without appeal to the uniqueness of 
the best possible world?
 In fact, idealism would make the gap wider, not narrower. For then it 
would arise not just with regard to our experiences of secondary quali-
ties but with all sensory perceptions whatsoever. If anything, then, the 
idealist’s rejection of the primary/secondary quality distinction makes 
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the need for the doctrine of the best possible world all the more pressing. 
Idealism is not a solution to the problem posed by the clash between 
sensible qualities and the PSR. True, there would then be no special 
problem of squaring sensations with the PSR, but only because all quali-
ties would be equally unmoored from any explanation in terms of the 
sizes, shapes, and motions of bodies. Hence, outside the context of the 
New Essays, it is, if anything, even clearer that Leibniz’s only solution 
is to appeal to the uniqueness of the best of all possible worlds.
5. ConClusIon
Pressure waves cause sensations of musical notes; wavelengths of light 
cause sensations of color. The PSR demands an explanation: why just 
these sensations and no others? To declare the connection arbitrary is 
to admit a “looseness of fit” into the nature of things no explanatory 
optimist can tolerate.
 Leibniz, for his part, sees the problem clearly and tries to solve it. 
His surface solution—representation as expression—can bring in some, 
but not all, of the slack. Even after we see that sensations represent 
(by expressing) their objects, there is still a degree of arbitrariness. Any 
change in qualities that preserves expression will escape the PSR’s net, 
for it generates multiple but equally satisfactory distributions of sensible 
qualities.
 And yet, or so I have argued, there is no problem of sensation for Leibniz, 
only a problem of the uniqueness of the best possible world. If Leibniz were 
able to muster a satisfactory argument for the claim that there is only 
one world among all others that is the best, that argument would at once 
dissolve Leibniz’s explanatory gap. Now, I do not claim that mounting such 
a uniqueness argument is easy or even possible. Nevertheless, absorbing 
one problem into another should count as philosophical progress.29
 Tracking Leibniz through this maze can teach us two lessons, I think. 
The first is simply that his explanatory gap exists. Philosophers friendly 
to the PSR have as much reason as Leibniz to worry about squaring it 
with the facts of sensation. The second lesson is that there is rather less 
to his appeals to representation than one might have hoped. Representa-
tion does not close Leibniz’s explanatory gap. I suspect this result is no 
accident and that contemporary attempts to deal with sensations and 
related issues like phenomenal character in terms of representation are 
equally doomed. But that is an argument for another day.30
University of Virginia
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NOTES
1. See Joseph Levine (1983, 354). In its initial, Kripke-inspired form, the 
gap lies between the physical and phenomenological sides of the identity theo-
rist’s equations. As Levine goes on to point out, of course, the gap is a problem 
for materialism generally. (Block-style arguments open up the same gap for 
functionalist theories, for example.)
2. The following abbreviations are used for works of Leibniz: A = Leibniz 
1923–; AG = Leibniz 1989; C = Leibniz 1903; G = Leibniz 1875–90; PW = Leibniz 
1973; L = Leibniz 1976; and NE = Leibniz 1996, whose pagination is that of 
Leibniz 1923–. References to the Monadology are to section numbers in G VI 
607–8; unless otherwise noted, translations follow those in AG.
3. I am not denying that Leibniz is concerned about mind-brain relations; 
the pre-established harmony is intended in part to cover just that sort of case. 
What I am claiming is that the core issue about sensation in the New Essays 
is not phenomenal character but the status of sensible qualities.
4. For the thought experiment, see Locke’s Essay, II.xxxii.15:389. (Ref-
erences to the Essay are in the following format: book.chapter.section:page 
number in Locke 1975.) C. L. Hardin (1997), among others, suggests that 
inverted spectra might not, after all, escape behavioral detection. If so, the 
scenario described by Locke would not be possible. Settling this issue would 
require disambiguating various notions of possibility and would take us too 
far afield. I invoke the inverted spectrum here only as an illustration, not as 
a premise in an argument.
5. While I follow the literature in using “sensation” in this way, it is po-
tentially misleading since there are, of course, sensory experiences of primary 
qualities.
6. For statements of the principle of sufficient reason, see, for example, the 
Monadology: “we can find no true or existent fact, no true assertion, without 
there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise” (§ 32).
7. I do not mean, of course, to suggest that the sensation itself is yellow; 
rather, this is short for a sensation of yellow. (“Sensation,” like “perception,” 
exhibits the familiar “ing/ed” ambiguity.)
8. If I am right, then much of the secondary literature is wrong to think of 
Leibniz as confronting the problem of “phenomenal character” in these texts. 
In particular, it is a mistake to read contemporary intentionalist theories of 
phenomenal character back into Leibniz, as Alison Simmons (2001) and Michael 
Della Rocca (2008, 118) do. Note that Simmons (2011) in some respects revises 
her earlier reading of Leibniz as endorsing a higher-order theory of conscious-
ness. These changes are not material to our discussion here.
9. Here I follow Simmons in thinking that a perception’s being distinct is 
its aptness to be noticed, a disposition that is grounded in the size, number, and 
variation among the petites perceptions (2001, 58; see also Simmons 2011).
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10. Some might take the “je ne sais quoi” as a sign that Leibniz has the con-
temporary notion of phenomenal character in mind. Instead, Leibniz is pointing to 
the inability to convey a conception of the “vivid-confused” in words. Leibniz argues 
that a person born blind could achieve a thorough understanding of geometry 
and, presumably, physics, though he would “not be able to achieve a conception 
of the vivid-confused, that is, of the image of light and colours” (NE 137).
11. For example, Leibniz writes, “a perception of light or colour of which we 
are aware is made up of [composée de] many minute perceptions of which we 
are unaware” (NE 134).
12. Defenders of the aggregate view include Simmons (2001) and Stephen 
Puryear (2013); Shane Duarte (2009, 709–10) and Martha Bolton (2011) defend 
the emergent view. The debate is well summarized by Christian Barth (2014).
13. I should note that there is a different sense of “confusion” at play in other 
Leibnizian texts. For example, in “On Wisdom,” Leibniz explains the appeal of 
music by observing, “Everything that emits a sound contains a vibration or a 
transverse motion such as we see in strings; thus everything that emits sounds 
gives off invisible impulses. When these are not confused, but proceed together 
in order but with a certain variation, they are pleasing” (L 425–26). Leibniz’s 
notion of confusion here is what we would call dissonance.
14. Remnant and Bennett translate fantôme as “image” rather than the 
more literal “phantom” because fantôme carries the suggestion of illusoriness, 
which image doesn’t. See their footnote 1 on 404. This is a strange procedure: 
clearly Leibniz’s point is that there is something illusory about sensations, and 
that’s exactly why he chooses fantôme rather than image.
15. Further support for the aggregate view might come from Leibniz’s discus-
sion of sensations in the “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas” from 1684. 
There, Leibniz classifies the kind of cognitio (awareness or knowledge) involved 
as at once clear and confused. Confused cognitio is such that we cannot “enumer-
ate one by one marks [nota] for differentiating a thing from others. . . And so we 
recognize colors, smells, tastes, and other particular objects of the senses clearly 
enough, and we distinguish them from others, but only through the simple tes-
timony of the senses, not by way of explicit marks” (AG 24). Similarly, the letter 
to Queen Sophie Charlotte tells us that the “notions of the particular senses” are 
“clear but confused” (AG 187). (I am grateful to an anonymous referee for direct-
ing me to these texts.) This picture fits nicely with Leibniz’s discussion in NE 
of the congenitally blind person (NE 137; see above, note 10). On the emergent 
side, however, we have to register the very end of the 1684 “Meditations.” There, 
Leibniz claims that, when we see green in a mixture of blue and yellow powder, 
“we sense only blue and yellow finely mixed, even though we do not notice this, 
but rather fashion some new thing for ourselves” (AG 27). And, indeed, even in 
NE, Leibniz claims that green “est naist du bleu et du jaune”; green is “born 
from” or “arises out of” blue and yellow. He does not say that green just is blue 
and yellow (NE 120; I owe this textual point to Duarte 2010, 709).
16. Earlier in the paper, Simmons points out that resemblance is just one 
way Leibnizian representation/expression can happen (2001, 41–42)
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17. And in a similar vein, a page later, Leibniz writes, “[W]hen the organ 
and the intervening medium are properly constituted, the internal bodily mo-
tions and the ideas which represent them to the soul resemble the motions of 
the object which cause the colour, the warmth, the pain etc.; or-what is here the 
same thing-they express the object through some rather precise relationship” ( 
NE 132–33).
18. Simmons is, of course, well aware of this text and others that point in 
the same direction. Simmons replies to this counterevidence by saying, “The 
apparent concession [that is, the move from literal resemblance to isomorphism] 
does not help because there does not seem to be any more of an intelligible 
isomorphism between a sensation of light and motions in the fire than there 
seems to be an exact resemblance” (2001, 68). But, even if Leibniz’s retreat to 
isomorphism doesn’t help, he retreats nonetheless.
19. See also NE 267 and Rutherford 1995, 84.
20. For a precise formulation of this kind of expression, see Ari Maunu (2008).
21. Duarte (2009, 711) speaks of the connection between sensations and 
their objects as “natural signification.” While Duarte usefully contrasts this 
connection with conventional signification (exemplified in natural languages), 
precisely what he means by “natural signification” remains elusive. As far as I 
can tell, it is Expression.
22. For more detailed accounts of expression, see Mark Kulstad (1977), 
Swoyer (1995), and Valérie Debuiche (2013). Debuiche argues that both Kulstad’s 
and Swoyer’s accounts have a foundation in the texts and that the differences 
between them correspond to differences between the work of Desargues and 
Pascal, both of whom influenced Leibniz (see esp. Debuiche 2013, 415–16) Noth-
ing for me turns on the differences among these accounts.
23. I owe this example to Steinhart (2009).
24. See, for example, Monadology, § 58.
25. My claims here are consistent with the fact that we know the reality 
and possibility of ideas of sensible qualities only through experience. As Leibniz 
says of sensible qualities in “Quelques Remarques sur le Livre de Mons. Locke,” 
“Aussi n’est ce point par elles-memes, ny a priori, mais par l’experience que nous 
en sçavons la realité ou la possibilité” (A 6.6, 8). It is the fact that, whatever they 
might be, they must be part of the best possible world that is known a priori.
26. See, for example, Brandon Look (2013) and Stephen Puryear (2013). I 
take no position here on whether Leibniz always or only occasionally endorses 
the mind-independent existence of corporeal substance.
27. For the first claim, see Daniel Garber (2009); for the second, Glenn Hartz 
(1998).
28. Leibniz writes that the “notions” of primary qualities “contain something 
imaginary and relative to our perception” (Discourse § 12, AG 44). For an ideal-
ist, there is no reason to privilege one set of qualities over the other: neither 
color nor shape, strictly speaking, belongs to a monad, only perception.
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29. There is a substantial literature on the “no best possible world” objec-
tion. See, for example, David Blumenfeld (1995), Lloyd Strickland (2005a and 
2005b), and Nicholas Rescher (2013). Strickland’s proposed reply to the objec-
tion (2005a), though not conducted in Leibniz’s terms, relies on the fact that 
the quality of a possible world is a function of a multiplicity of goods, not just 
the happiness of the creatures in it. This is certainly Leibniz’s view; one of the 
criteria will be the simplicity of the laws that operate in the world at issue. As 
Rescher points out, the issue is complicated by the fact that Leibniz “nowhere 
treats in detail the range of issues involved in determining the relative simplic-
ity of law systems, and indeed he does not seem to recognize the complexities 
that inhere in this issue” (2013, 25). It seems to me that the prospects for an-
swering the no-best-possible-world-objection in Leibniz’s case turn on just this 
sort of issue. The best general discussion I have found is Blumenfeld (1995). As 
Blumenfeld points out, Leibniz typically defines the best world as the one that 
maximizes variety and simplicity. But Leibniz also says that the best possible 
world is “the most perfect morally” (G VII 306/ L 489, quoted in Blumenfeld 
1995, 398). Leibniz appears to think that the world contains as much happiness 
and virtue as possible. Moreover, in the Tentamen Anagogicum of 1695 (G VII, 
270–79), Leibniz suggests that each part of the world (and not just the world 
as a whole) is perfect in itself, providing yet another constraint on the choice of 
possible world. Taken together, all of these criteria make it plausible, although 
far from certain, that there is indeed a unique best possible world. (This note 
is substantially indebted to an anonymous referee for this journal.)
30. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of Vir-
ginia in the spring of 2014. I thank all the participants, especially Brie Gertler, 
Harold Langsam, and Antonia LoLordo, for helpful criticisms. And I am indebted 
to two anonymous referees for this journal.
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